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North Korea and the Enigma of Survival1
Counterfactual History1
Despite the soft focus of the orientalist media, North Korea is not an enigma. 
The fact of its mere “brute existence” shouldn’t seduce or astonish us any more 
than the “diversity” of the capitalist system that seemingly hems it in on all 
sides. And yet its stubborn long-term survival, much like capitalism’s, quite ar-
guably does represent something of an enigma. The question of North Korea to-
day is that of the political endurance and continuity of a regime whose “social 
experiment” should long ago have been jettisoned into the dustbin of history. 
Its blanket demonization and ostracism by the “international community” is 
proof of a profoundly abnormal country, a zombie state which certainly resists 
the norms of the modern liberal state. As Jon Halliday once put it, “no state in 
the world lives with such a wide gap between its own self-image and self-pres-
entation as a socialist ‘paradise on earth’ and the view of most of the rest of the 
world that it is a bleak, backward workhouse ruled by a megalomaniac tyrant, 
Kim Il Sung.”2 And yet, all appearances aside, what I want to suggest is that 
there is a rational kernel at work here, not so much “beneath” the thin veneer of 
paranoid propaganda that comprises its overtly repressive state apparatus, but 
in terms of North Korea’s position within the uneven and combined develop-
ment of global capitalism. Modernization too is a process which, all appearanc-
es aside, North Korea has been strongly committed to since its foundation, even 
if in this respect the ideology is prone to part company with the reality, as the 
much-trumpeted “successes” of its social plan become ever more symptomatic 
of massive and grotesque system failure. North Korea didn’t suddenly fall from 
the sky. The evil features of this “hermit kingdom” have grown out of the very 
traits of the modern state in general. Journalistic platitudes and general bias 
aside, North Korea is not a feudal state or an anachronistic theocracy, but rather 
1 This work was supported by the Kyung Hee University Research Grant (KHU-20150648).
2 Jon Halliday, “The North Korean Enigma” in: New Left Review, London, 127, 1980, p. 18.
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a nation-state with an obsessive attitude towards modernization as well as the 
strong ambition to be one of the most advanced countries in the world. 
Superman didn’t land in North Korea. In Superman: Red Son3 Mark Miller presents 
us with a counterfactual history which explores what might have happened had 
the rocket ship carrying the young alien from Krypton landed on Earth slightly 
ahead of time. In this case the “advanced” landing deposits the future superhero 
in Ukraine, where instead of growing up in the free state of Kansas and becoming 
a journalist on the Daily Planet, he grows up on a collective farm and becomes a 
journalist on Pravda. One needs to set aside one’s prejudices in order to begin to 
bring North Korea into proper focus—although granted such formal reversals of 
good versus evil are limited in their critical scope. My contention here will be that 
the “monstrosity” of North Korea is nothing more than the unmasked identity 
of the modern state, the naked face of state violence. What one should question 
here is not what kind of country North Korea is, but instead what North Korea 
contributes to questions of modernity and modernization. In short, the suppos-
edly “enigmatic” aspect of North Korea lies at the extremity of modernization, 
which has been pursued by both the socialist bloc and the capitalist bloc in the 
postwar world. As such the North Korean question should be revised in order to 
ask why the dual process of modernization and democratization ends up in the 
strange accomplishment of its secular theocratic regime. 
The Democratic Paradox
The political ambition of North Korea as a modern state seems to lurk in its 
official name: The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Like South 
Korea, North Korea insists on being the only legitimate government of the en-
tire peninsula. North Korea calls itself a “democratic” people’s republic—un-
like South Korea, which is simply “republic” (ROK)—whose people (dêmos) are 
nominally deprived of power (krátos). Historically the appellation of a Demo-
cratic People’s Republic is certainly not unique to North Korea (one thinks of 
the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (1987—91) under Mengistu Haile 
Mariam). The idea of popular fronts as adherents of “democracy” can be traced 
back to Stalin’s (failed) attempt to create a multi-class form of government in 
the Soviet Union. In the case of North Korea the obsession with modernization 
3 Mark Miller, et. al., Superman: Red Son (New York: DC Comics,  2004). 
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and nation-building under the direction of the country’s communist party, the 
Worker’s Party of Korea, goes some way towards explaining the endurance of 
the idea of “democracy” in a supposedly socialist state.
 
Kim Il Sung, its visionary leader, not to mention the country’s deity, was the 
Superman sent down from Soviet heaven to construct a new country. In North 
Korean propaganda, Kim promised his people daily rations of “rice and meat 
soup” for participating in guerrilla warfare against the Japanese imperialists. 
After liberation, the guerilla figure took power during the Soviet occupation 
and started to implement a strongly partisan agenda. First of all, as much as in 
other post-colonial countries, Kim Il Sung and his followers set about reinvent-
ing the past. The situation whereby the North Korean leader created the racial 
self-image of his nation is described in the following terms: 
Though most Koreans in 1945 had no memory of life before Japanese rule, neither 
the Soviets nor the Americans saw a need to de-colonize hearts and minds. That 
the Koreans now hated Japan was taken as proof that they had always done so. 
Nor did either power punish former propagandists. In Seoul, the cultural scene’s 
spontaneous efforts to come to terms with its past were soon undermined by 
the settling of personal scores and a general refusal to acknowledge a collec-
tive guilt. Obscure ex-collaborators condemned the famous ones, those who had 
propagandized in Korean asserted moral superiority over those who had done so 
in Japanese, and erstwhile ‘proletarians’ acted as if their brief prison stays in the 
1930s made up for everything they had written afterward.4 
When Korea was liberated from colonialism, a ground zero emerged on which 
anybody obtaining power could fabricate anything about history. The situation 
provided the perfect condition for modernization. Even though Kim Il Sung was 
one day a commander in Mao Zedong’s army and spent a year at an infantry 
officer school in the USSR during the Pacific War, his ideological background 
was unlikely to have familiarized him a great deal with Marxism-Leninism. As 
North Korean propaganda frequently emphasizes today, he was in those days 
more inclined to the alliance between socialism and nationalism. He even in-
sisted that Korea was on the stage of democratic reform and construction, not 
4 Bryan Myers, The Cleanest Race: How North Koreans See Themselves and Why It Matters 
(New York: Melville House, 2010), p. 30. 
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socialism as such.5 Needless to say, this does not mean that North Korea came to 
“communism” via nationalism. The communist regime was implanted in Korea 
by the USSR and backed up by the Red Army from the time of its foundation.6 
Challenging the nationalist intellectuals such as Cho Man Sik, Kim attempted 
to consolidate his support base and mobilized more people to participate in 
constructing his regime. 
The official name of North Korea indicates the historical background of Kim’s 
nation-building project. The “democratic people” are those who join in the 
democratic reform and construction against the United States-led world order. 
The emphasis of the people who advocate democracy, i.e. common people’s 
rule, reveals the “democratic paradox” as such: if everybody rules, who would 
be ruled? As Carl Schmitt points out, those who command and those who obey 
are identical in democracy.7 If democracy means that the sovereign of an as-
sembly composed of all people can change the laws and constitution at will, the 
question remains who belongs to the people and who does not? The people able 
to decide the law at will must be determined. Accordingly “Democratic People’s 
Republic” is inclusive and at the same time exclusive in its constitutional ar-
rangements. It seeks to include those who agree on democratic reform and con-
struction and excludes those who disagree, as the very basis of its constitution. 
Chantal Mouffe regards Schmitt’s definition of democracy as the means by 
which a people comes to exist through the determination of who to include and 
who to exclude. She says that “without any criterion to determine who are the 
bearers of democratic rights, the will of the people could never take shape.”8 Of 
course, this definition of “democracy” is ill-suited to liberal accounts of democ-
racy. However, Schmitt’s critique of liberal democracy is in some sense amena-
ble to the constitutional dynamics of North Korea. Clearly North Korea does not 
endorse liberal democracy, but rather the dictatorship of the proletariat. Inter-
estingly, there is a crucial clue to Kim Il Sung’s political concept of democracy 
in his speech on the dictatorship of the proletariat from 1967. In these remarks, 
5 Chong-Sik Lee and Robert A. Scalapino, North Korea: Building of the Monolithic State (Ber-
wyn: The KHU Press, 2017), p. 43.
6 Ibid., p. 83. 
7 Carl Schmitt, The Crisis of Parliamentary Democracy, trans. Allen Kennedy (Cambridge 
MA: The MIT Press, 1988), pp. 14–15. 
8 Chantal Mouffe, The Democratic Paradox (London: Verso, 2000), p. 43.
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Kim criticized both “the Right opportunist view” and “the Left opportunist 
view” on the dictatorship of the proletariat in relation to the transition period 
of the communist revolution, before setting out his own theory of the third way, 
the so-called Juche:
We must take into account such specific realities of ours in order to give correct 
solutions to the questions of the transition period and the dictatorship of the pro-
letariat. Bearing this point in mind, I consider it excessive to regard the transition 
period in our country as the period up to the higher phase of communism. I deem 
it right to regard it as the period up to socialism. But it is wrong to believe that the 
transition period will come to a close as soon as the socialist revolution is victorious 
and the socialist system is established. Considering the issue on the basis of what 
the founders of Marxism-Leninism said, or considering it in the light of the experi-
ences we have gained in our actual struggle, we cannot say that a complete social-
ist society is already built just because the capitalist class has been overthrown and 
the socialist revolution carried through after the seizure of power by the working 
class. We, therefore, have never said that the establishment of the socialist system 
means the complete victory of socialism. Then, when will the complete socialist 
society come into being? Complete victory of socialism will come only when the 
class distinction between the workers and the peasantry has disappeared and the 
middle classes (particularly the peasant masses) actively support us.9 
According to Kim’s argument, the problem is not so much the transition of the 
capitalist mode of production to a socialist one as that of the “working-classi-
zation” of the middle classes. Kim points out that “as long as the peasants are 
not working-classized, the support they may give us cannot be firm and is bound 
to be rather unstable”.10 How then is social transformation to be achieved? Kim 
places the emphasis on rapid economic development as the means for the con-
solidation of socialism. He argues that “to this end, the technological revolution 
should be carried out to such an extent as the advanced capitalist countries have 
turned their countryside capitalistic, so that farming may be mechanized, chem-
icalization and irrigation be introduced, and the eight-hour day be adopted”.11
9 Kim Il Sung, Juche! Speeches and Writings of Kim Il Sung, ed. Li Yuk-Sa (New York: Gross-
man Publishers, 1972), p. 117.
10 Ibid.
11 Ibid., p. 118.
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This utterance reveals the meaning of working-classizing the peasants. Despite 
railing against the orthodox doctrine of Marxism-Leninism, forever emphasiz-
ing how North Korean realities differ from those of Europe and Russia, Kim’s 
theory of socialism is a somewhat circular argument which sets out how the 
stable material basis of socialism is to be achieved: socialism is its own theo-
ry’s goal. This is nothing new for anyone already familiar with Stalin’s theory 
of socialism in one country. In his letter to Ivanov, “On the Final Victory of 
Socialism in the USSR,” Stalin claimed socialism in one country does not mean 
the final accomplishment of revolution; instead, the international alliance of 
the proletariat can solve the problem of one-state socialism. Moreover, “this 
assistance of the international proletariat must be combined with our work to 
strengthen the defense of our country, to strengthen the Red Army and the Red 
Navy, to mobilize the whole country for the purpose of resisting military attack 
and attempts to restore bourgeois relations.”12 
What should be stressed in Kim’s speech is not his vulgar reception of Sta-
linism, but rather his adaption of Stalinist ideas in North Korea. Kim rejects 
Stalin’s assumption that the USSR has successfully purged the legacy of the 
bourgeois society and asks rhetorically, “what, then, shall we say is the society 
that will exist after the triumph of the socialist revolution and accomplishment 
of socialist transformation, until the disappearance of the class distinction 
between the workers and the peasants?”13 Kim insists that the dictatorship of 
the proletariat must continue in order to eliminate class differences. This is a 
crucial point for understanding the ideological structure of nation-building in 
North Korea. However, what Kim really sought to achieve was not, as Barbara 
Demick says, “merely to build a new country; he wanted to build better people, 
to reshape human nature.”14 This project to reconstruct consciousness is called 
Juche, which stands for the independence of people. Its doctrine is “holding 
fast to an independent position, rejecting dependence on others, using one’s 
own brains, believing in one’s own strength, displaying the revolutionary spirit 
of self-reliance.”15 On the surface at least it certainly recalls the liberal rubric 
of self-government. Nonetheless, one distinctive aspect could be identified in 
12 Joseph Stalin, Works, Volume 14 (London: Red Star Press, 1978), p. 320.
13 Kim, op. cit., p. 120. 
14 Barbara Demick, Nothing to Envy: Ordinary Lives in North Korea (New York: Spiegel and 
Grau, 2010), p. 44. 
15 Ibid. 
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the ideology of Juche: people’s confidence in their leader is essential to the es-
tablishment of such independence. This is where the psychic life of power is 
introduced into the political. 
The Monstrosity of North Korea
North Korea may indeed be characterized as grotesque, but it is not the “Impos-
sible State.” Victor Cha describes North Korea as being caught between life and 
death after the collapse of the “mighty Soviet Union.”16 Cha’s understanding of 
North Korea betrays the typical bias shown towards the country, which is of-
ten misrecognized through the liberal prism of democracy. It is intriguing that 
Cha confesses his inability to solve the enigma of North Korea’s survival. He 
suggests that the reason why North Korea has survived—though “many others 
of its ilk have long since collapsed, and as revolutions in the Middle East and 
North Africa spell the demise of the few remaining ones like it”—resides in the 
over-the-top personality cult of the Kim family.17 Cha correctly brings into focus 
what Kim Il Sung intends with the term Juche. The doctrine of Juche is nothing 
less than the secular version of Christianity, wherein fidelity to the supreme fig-
ure of authority sets one free from the fear of death. Kim is the “dear respected 
leader comrade,” the symbol of a political religion. However, the idolization of 
a singular political leader is hardly a feature unique to North Korea. 
In North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics, Heonik Kwon and Byung-Ho 
Chung discuss North Korea as a modern state by invoking Max Weber’s concept 
of charismatic politics. Kwon and Chung argue that:
There is actually no mystery about the North Korean political system. The North 
Korean state is not an enigmatic entity and never has been. What North Korea 
had was simply a highly skillful political leader who knew how to build an aura 
of enchanting charismatic power around him. This leader understood the effi-
cacy of this power for mobilizing the masses toward ambitious political goals, 
and he was committed to keeping the power not only during his lifetime but also 
beyond the time of his rule. Modern world history abounds with similar charis-
matic, visionary leaders and the stories about their rise and fall. The same is true 
16 Victor Cha, The Impossible State: North Korea, Past and Future (New York: Ecco, 2013), p. 7.
17 Ibid., p. 13.
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in the history of the Cold War and in the political history of the communist world 
that constituted the moiety of the Cold War international order.18
Kwon and Chung resist the demonization of the communist regime and attempt 
to deconstruct the fetishism of liberal democracy. They point out that “the per-
formance of secular revolutionary politics, while aiming to demystify tradition-
al religious norms and mystical ideas … often involved the mystification of the 
authority and power of the revolutionary leadership.”19 As they rightly claim, 
what is at issue is not the cult of personality, but its sustainability in North 
Korea. How does North Korea’s charismatic politics outlive others? According 
to Weber, any charismatic authority must be subject to “interpretation or devel-
opment in an anti-authoritarian direction.”20 This anti-authoritarian direction 
leads to the “transformation of charisma.” If the enchanted charisma of the 
political leader is supposed to be disenchanted by the process of moderniza-
tion, then the case of North Korea would seem to suggest that Weber’s theory of 
charismatic politics is problematic. 
For Weber, the concept of charisma is related to religious dogmatism. In this 
sense, he describes the way in which the progress of rationalization in “the 
organization of the corporate group” demystifies the charismatic authority for 
whom universal respect was once a duty. From this perspective it is easy to con-
clude that the ruling ideology of Juche contaminates North Koreans and blocks 
them from progressive rationalization. However, as Weber admits, the charis-
matic leader cannot sustain himself without the people’s free will: “the leader 
whose legitimacy rested on his personal charisma” should be followed by the 
political support of those who are “formally free to elect and elevate to power 
as they please and even to depose.”21 Through free election, the leader loses his 
or her charisma and in turn genuine legitimacy. And yet the suspicion remains 
that Kim Il Sung and his partisan comrades successfully and “freely” managed 
to champion and sustain their legitimacy whilst retaining a charisma which 
goes hand in hand with modernization. This is where the central question aris-
18 Heonik Kwon and Byung-Ho Chung, North Korea: Beyond Charismatic Politics (London: 
Rowan and Littlefield Publishers, 2012), p. 1.
19 Ibid.
20 Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic Organization, ed. Talcott Parsons, trans. A. 
M. Henderson and Talcott Parsons (New York: The Free Press, 1947), p. 386.
21 Ibid.
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es. If North Korea thrives on the sovereign defence of its charismatic politics, 
is it really accurate to regard it, formally speaking, as a model socialist coun-
try? This question currently animates the political group of left nationalists in 
South Korea, who still concur on the pan-national authenticity of North Korea. 
It seems that the problem with Weber’s theory lies in his identification of ration-
alization or modernization with the marketization of capitalism. His conceptu-
alization of charisma is descriptive and does not bear out the situation of North 
Korea. In respect of this weakness, Kwon and Chung put forward the concept 
of a “theater state” to account for the endurance of North Korean politics in 
citing the works of Clifford Geertz, Wada Haruki and Carol Medlicott.22 In short, 
North Korea is a theater state in which all members of the community play a 
part and, at the same time, watch “the drama of power transfer from the coun-
try’s founding leader, Kim Il Sung, to his eldest son and the country’s former 
leader, Kim Jong Il.”23 With this concept, Wada also underscores North Korea’s 
obsession with the transmission of power down the generations and regards 
it as the ritualization of its partisan tradition. Wada’s adoption of the concept 
of a “theater state” seems clear; to attribute the grotesque dimensions of North 
Korea to its pre-modern or feudalist remnants. Furthermore, Medlicott argues 
that “the North Korean political order is fundamentally Confucian.”24 However, 
outright displays of affection towards the beloved leader hardly provide deci-
sive evidence that North Koreans are saturated with Confucianism. As Myers 
points out, “almost all cultures espouse respect for one’s parents, and kinship 
metaphors have been part of political language since time immemorial.”25 In 
this sense it seems that Wada’s and Medlicott’s premise, commonly shared by 
other North Korea commentators, neglects the bigger picture. Their concept of 
a “theater state” is too anthropological, too mired in the myths of “primitive 
peoples,” to capture the reality of North Korea and its political regime. 
The theatrical spectacle of power is just a symptom, not the cause of the gro-
tesque. The theory of a “theater state” reiterates the problem that Weber’s the-
ory of charismatic politics reveals. These approaches fail to gain access to the 
22 Kwon and Chung, op. cit., pp. 44–45.
23 Ibid., p. 44.
24 Ibid., p. 45.
25 Myers, op. cit., p. 97.
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truth of North Korea. The spectacle they validate as evidence of pre-modern 
ritualization has nothing to do with the regressive re-enchantment of the sec-
ular theocracy. My contention is that the theocratic aspect of North Korea is 
the hidden truth of the modern state as such, the brutal revelation of extreme 
modernization. Its grotesque spectacle is to be discerned as the mirror image of 
Western modernity. 
The North Korean Lesson
In Secret State: Inside North Korea, Will Ridley’s CNN special report of 2017, a 
North Korean boy, whose birthday party is being prepared by his school, in-
forms the foreign journalist that the dear respected leader, Kim Jung Un, cares 
for him and his classmates more than their own parents, and gives them more 
love than their parents could ever provide.26 Setting aside the overt ideological 
agenda of such hot media, the journalist takes the interview with the boy as 
confirmation of an ultra-paternalist leadership in North Korea. Should we be 
surprised by the deep roots of such authoritarian constitutions, of which North 
Korea is admittedly an extreme variety? 
Cicero wrote that “since our country provides more benefits and is a parent 
prior to our biological parents, we have a greater obligation to it than to our 
parents.”27 The idea of a parental constitution, or the fundamental bond that 
links pater familias and res publica, is in actual fact an intriguing philosophical 
question. As Jochen Martin has argued: 
those aspects concerning the agnatic familia and the power of the paterfamilias 
are not to be taken as “private” aspects relegated to domestic life. Instead they 
are essential to the political and social organization of the res publica Romana – 
especially the extensive powers of the paterfamilias, his ius vitae necisque, have 
to be paralleled to the magistrates’ potestas.28
26 Secret State – Inside North Korea. CNN, 2017. Available at: <youtu.be/9C0zTmjMxEg>.
27 Marcus Tullius Cicero, On Commonwealth and On the Laws, trans. James Zetzel (Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 1. 
28 Ann-Cathrin Harders, “Beyond Oikos and Domus: Modern Kinship Studies and the Ancient 
Family” in: Families in the Greco-Roman World, eds. Ray Laurence and Agneta Stromberg 
(London: Continuum, 2012), p.17.  
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One should be wary of trying to transpose a politics from the domestic realm 
into the realm of real politics and the executive power of the state, which in 
the case of North Korea amounts to the charismatic leadership of a sole figure. 
In the Roman context the authority of the pater familias is limited—“embed-
ded”—by and within the overriding terms of the res publica. Occasions were 
few when the pater familias could act on behalf of the state and take the law 
into his own hands.29 One should be equally wary of practicing Orientalism 
by contriving to make North Korea conform to certain “universal” patterns of 
political constitution, which are no less embedded in Greco-Roman myth for all 
that.30 For those who consume North Korea as the spectacle of grotesque polit-
ical failure, its outlandish society cannot fail to be mysterious or, better still, 
“exotic”. Nonetheless, the “strangeness” of North Korea is equally intelligible 
through the experience of foreign intervention and the encounter with Western 
political traditions. As Myers argues, North Korea’s conflation of nationalism 
with socialism was founded on the “blood-based Japanese nationalism of the 
colonial era.”31 Like South Korea, the whole nation-building process in North 
Korea is “the slavish imitation of foreign models and an often contemptuous 
indifference to indigenous traditions.”32
Kim Il Sung himself emphasized a break from the traditions of feudalism and 
urged his people to renovate everyday life according to the USSR’s superior cul-
ture. Kim’s compulsion to modernize North Korea was consistent with his the-
ory of a socialism conceived in terms of Juche. Adopting Lenin’s New Economic 
Policy, Kim set up the Seven-Year Plan to clean up the residues of feudalism: 
The fundamental tasks of the Seven-Year Plan in our country are to carry out 
the all-round technical and cultural revolution on the basis of the triumphant 
socialist system, thereby laying the solid material and technical foundations 
of socialism and greatly improving the material and cultural life of the people. 
In a country like ours, where there were no industrial revolution and normal 
29 Ibid.
30 On the relation of myth and law see Jean-Pierre Vernant and Pierre Vidal-Naquet, Myth 
and Tragedy in Ancient Greece (New York: Zone Books, 1988). Jason Barker references the 
book in his fascinating analysis of the drama of civil war; see his contribution to this 
volume.  
31 Myers, op. cit., p. 37.
32 Ibid.
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stages of capitalist development in the past, the technical revolution poses itself 
as a task of special importance during the socialist construction. In conformity 
with the urgent demands of social development, we have completed the socialist 
transformation of production relations before the technical reconstruction of the 
national economy, thereby opening up a broad avenue for the development of the 
productive forces, particularly for the carrying out of the technical revolution.33 
It is not difficult to detect in this speech Kim’s foregrounding of the “technical 
revolution”. Needless to say this is a complete perversion of Marx’s insistence 
on the driving contradiction between the forces and relations of production.34 
Interestingly, Kim identifies the technical revolution with the cultural revolu-
tion. In a characterstically circular argument, the construction of the modern 
nation-state is the raison d’État of North Korea as a socialist state. For Kim, 
moreover, the accomplishment of self-reliance and self-defense is the only path 
to the correct form of socialism. Needless to say Kim’s grandson, Kim Jung Un, 
has taken this enthusiasm through his development of nuclear missile technol-
ogy to its logical extremes. 
It is undeniable that Kim’s regime has succeeded in defending its legitimacy 
while ruthlessly pursuing its country’s modernization. The two features of the 
regime strongly condition each other. Nonetheless we are still brought back to 
the question of how the charismatic leadership has managed to remain intact. 
Although it is often called a pseudo-theocracy, the political regime of the North 
is strongly animated by the idea of the modern nation-state. Countless observ-
ers regard North Korea as the pre-modern state ruled by sovereign power, but 
North Korea’s incarnation of the state-form inevitably shares the disciplinary 
imperative characteristic of the demands of managing the masses in tandem 
with the real or imaginary threat of enemy populations. As Michel Foucault 
argues, disciplinary power and biopower are the modern forms of power to be 
distinguished from sovereign power. Where sovereign power wholly invests 
civil society with its political “will” and power of decision-making, discipli-
nary power and the scientific and techno-managerialism of biopower embrace 
“freedom” at the micro-political level. 
33 Kim, op. cit., p. 30.
34 See Greg Sharzer’s contribution to this volume on the selective readings by acceleration-
ists of Marx’s theory of the economic forces and social relations that define capitalism. 
161
north korea and the enigma of survival
The difference between disciplinary power and biopower resides in the way in 
which the former focuses on the population as masses rather than on the body 
as a biological unit, or on human beings as a species. According to Foucault, 
liberalism is the framework of biopolitics: “the principle of the self-limitation 
of governmental reason.”35 Liberalism celebrates limited government, and gov-
erning less, and maximizing economic efficiency by setting the individual to 
work in the element of its own design, or “program,” and thus in spite of any po-
litical structure that might limit its own self-governance. One might speculate 
that the relative autonomy of the social practices comprising the social forma-
tion as a whole today extends to individuals themselves: for every individual, a 
distinct practice; and, crucially, every individual as a distinct practice. Leaving 
the question of agency and the political subject aside—and there is cause to 
wonder whether there is any such thing in North Korea—what appears as the 
oxymoronic articulation of a bio-politics suggests a return to the metaphysical 
conception of the world as the non-interaction of monads. 
But how does this leave the state philosophy of Juche? It is my contention, and 
in these few limited remarks I have attempted to begin to sketch out the the-
sis, that such a philosophy might be broadly compatible with the self-reflexive 
praxis of self-governing, and the formation of self-reliant individuals endowed 
with the “free will” to support the dear respected leader. It goes without saying 
that the state-form and the drive toward modernization is a near-universal po-
litical ambition, and has become a condition of the political the world over. All 
politics, whether radical or reactionary, must sooner or later “encounter” the 
liberal nation-state, whether in the guise of friend or enemy. But the ongoing 
and stubborn contradiction of North Korea resides in the fact that its grotesque 
incarnation of the state-form would seem untroubled by and, indeed, in certain 
key respects perfectly in tune with, the liberal incarnation. Accompanying the 
driving force and ideology of modernization there is the seeming paradox of an 
enduring charismatic leadership which revives and perhaps even outdoes the 
most blatant excesses of Stalin’s cult of personality—although, let us not forget, 
Kim Jung Un is hardly the only would-be Superman presently grandstanding 
35 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at Collège de France 1978–79 (New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p. 20.
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on the world stage.36 For this reason, North Korea does not represent an alien 
form of humanity, but has rather come to symbolize one of modernity’s mon-
sters: the extreme outlier of a liberal system where the freedom of self-reliance 
on one hand, and more overtly disciplinary forms of government and state con-
trol on the other, are differences in degree, rather than qualitative differences 
in kind. Rethinking North Korean from this vantage point will arguably provide 
a more constructive basis for tackling the far more awkward question of the 
transition to new and more progressive political regimes.
36 On 16 June 2018, days following the US-North Korea summit in Singapore, Donald Trump 
said (jokingly?) of Kim: “He speaks and his people sit up at attention. I want my people to 
do the same.” Available at: <www.cnbc.com/2018/06/15/trump-wants-people-to-listen-to-
him-like-north-koreans-do-to-kim-jong-un.html>.
